Abstract. We define the paraconsistent supra-logic Pσ by a type-shift from the booleans o of propositional logic Po to the supra-booleans σ of the propositional type logic P obtained as the propositional fragment of the transfinite type theory Q defined by Peter Andrews (North-Holland Studies in Logic 1965) as a classical foundation of mathematics.
The supra-logic is in a sense a propositional logic only, but since there is an infinite number of supra-booleans and arithmetical operations are available for this and other types, virtually anything can be specified. The supra-logic is a generalization of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic, with the intermediate value duplicated many times and ordered such that none of the copies of this value imply other ones, but it differs from Lukasiewicz's many-valued logics as well as from logics based on bilattices (the latter have additional designated truth values). There are several automated theorem provers for classical higher order logic and it should be possible to modify these to our needs.
We consider truth tables with the determinate truth values • and • for truth and falsehood, respectively, and indeterminate truth values and (only • is designated). Very briefly we do as follows: For negation ¬ we propose to map • to • and vice versa, leaving the other values unchanged (after all, we want the double negation law ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ to hold for all formulas ϕ). We would like de Morgan laws to holds for disjunction ∨ with respect to negation ¬ and conjunction ∧; hence ϕ∨ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ). For implication → we have the classically acceptable ϕ → ψ ≡ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ. For conjunction ∧ we want the idempotent law to hold and • should to be neutral, and • is the default result. For biimplication ↔ we want reflexivity and • should to be neutral, • should be negation, and again • is the default result. The universal quantification is defined using the same principles as a kind of generalized conjunction and the existential quantification follows from a generalized de Morgan law. 
Introduction
Type theory was invented by Russell in 1908* as a way to avoid the paradox in naive set theory that he had discovered a few years earlier (years marked with * refers to papers in [30] ). Some remarks about type theory were already present in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) and it was developed further in the monumental Principia Mathematica (1910-13, with Whitehead). During the following decades more elegant type theories were introduced. Gödel in 1931* used the so-called simple type theory in order to establish his famous incompleteness theorems. These early type theories, as well as the other type theories we shall consider, are based on classical logic, meaning that they can be seen as extensions of the propositional logic P o (with the usual operators for negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, implication →, and biimplication ↔) as formally defined by Frege in 1879*. In a classical logic everything (thus nothing useful at all) follows from an inconsistency. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where an inconsistency does not lead to such an explosion, and since in practice consistency is difficult to achieve for substantial theories, paraconsistent logics have many applications, in particular in computer science / artificial intelligence [15, 12, 9, 1] .
The transfinite type theory Q (with type variables) was defined by Peter Andrews in 1965 [4] as a natural extension of the finite type theory Q 0 (without type variables) proposed by Alonzo Church in 1940 [14] . The letter Q seems appropriate since the concept of equality is taken as the main primitive along the lines of Leon Henkin in 1963 [22, 3] . The main result of Andrews was a definition of the concept of truth for Q 0 and a proof of its adequacy in Q, and to our knowledge neither Q nor similar transfinite type theories have been investigated much further. By the way, the idea of transfinite type theory goes back to Russell, Poincaré, Hilbert, and Gödel, cf. his footnote 48a in 1931*.
Since Q allows reasoning about types using quantifiers etc. we often refer to it as a type logic (we also find that its axioms "can be regarded as purely logical" [4, p. xiii], but this philosophical issue is of course debatable). We note that Q can be proven consistent in standard set theory ZFC [25] .
Our aim is to use just a fragment of Q in a new approach to paraconsistency [32] . We refer to the fragment as the propositional type logic P since it is a restriction of the type logic Q to propositional types. However, the notion of propositional types is very powerful since it contains both finite and transfinite types and P is strong enough to serve as a foundation of mathematics since it contains the simple type theory used by Gödel in 1931* (also named P, probably due to the inclusion of the postulates for the natural numbers used by Peano in 1889*). Since P is a fragment of Q it can be proven consistent in standard set theory ZFC as well.
The propositional type logic P has two distinguished types, namely booleans o and supra-booleans σ (we could also refer to these types as "propositions" and "supra-propositions", but since we later use both types in connection with propositional logics, we prefer to use "booleans" and "supra-booleans" here).
A boolean takes either of the values "true" or "false" (this use of the word "boolean" is standard not only in computer science today but in mathematics too [11] , even though the algebras considered by Boole were usual more general).
A supra-boolean takes any of a specific infinite collection of values which includes the booleans. The type of booleans is an example of a finite type and the type of supra-booleans is an example of a transfinite type. To any transfinite type there is a corresponding finite type, e.g. supra-booleans and booleans. We return to these notions shortly.
Using the propositional type logic P we define another logic, called the supralogic P σ , by performing a so-called type-shift from the booleans o to the suprabooleans σ (type-shifts are well-known in linguistics, cf. [29, 16, 13] ). The supralogic P σ is in a sense a propositional logic only, but since there is an infinite number of supra-booleans and arithmetical operations are available for this and other types, virtually anything can be specified.
The supra-logic P σ is a paraconsistent logic and in a sense the difference between classical and paraconsistent logic in this setting is a difference in type: finite type versus transfinite type. It is a generalization of Lukasiewicz's threevalued logic, with the intermediate value duplicated many times and ordered such that none of the copies of this value imply other ones, but it differs from Lukasiewicz's many-valued logics as well as from more recent logics based on bilattices [8, 18, 6, 20] where the third value means "neither true nor false" and the fourth value means "both true and false" (and is designated as well).
We would like to point out that we do not formally describe the semantics of the transfinite type theory (this is investigated in [4] and elsewhere; see also [5, 24, 33] for the semantics of finite type theory). The semantic clauses for our paraconsistent logic described later deal with the propositional part only and are expressible syntactically in the transfinite type theory (hence the adequacy of the semantic clauses is not an issue).
On the Notion of Types
Since types play a central role in the present work, we start with some general remarks. The original motivation for types, as proposed by Russell, was to avoid paradoxes, not only Russell's "logical" paradox, but also many "semantical" paradoxes (the labels "logical" and "semantical" are due to Ramsey). For this reason Russell used a complicated notion of ramified types, but since these types are not sufficient for mathematics in general, an axiom of reducibility needed to be added, effectively resulting in the simple type theory as mentioned earlier.
In the simple type theory the types themselves correspond to the natural numbers, namely type 0 is the set of natural numbers, type 1 is the set of subsets of type 0, type 2 is the set of subsets of type 1, etc. But after the introduction of the λ-calculus by Church, in particular the finite type theory [14] , it is common to view types not "negatively" as a means to avoid paradoxes but "positively" as a means to describe the domain and codomain of functions.
Going back to at least Schönfinkel in 1924* it is known that one-argument functions suffice: a function of say two arguments is taken to be a function from the first argument to a function from the second argument to the result.
Hence if α and β are types then αβ is the type of functions from α to β. If ι is the type of natural numbers then we have the following correspondance with the types in simple type theory: 0 is ι, 1 is ιo, 2 is (ιo)o, 3 is ((ιo)o)o, and so on.
Propositional Type Logic -Language & Motivation
We present the propositional fragment P of the transfinite type theory Q [4] . We use the symbols and ⊥ for the classical truth values • (truth) and • (falsehood), respectively. As usual the designated truth value • yields the logical truths.
α, β, γ, δ, and τ range over types. The transfinite types are built as follows: o is the first finite type (the booleans), σ is the first transfinite type (the suprabooleans), and if α and β are types then αβ is the type of functions from α to β. The finite types are the types built from o only. αβ . . . δτ stands for α(β(. . . (δτ ))) and αβ . . . τ stands for αβ . . . τ o.
The usual operators of propositional logic have the following types: negation ¬ type oo (or o ) and conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, implication →, biimplication ↔ type ooo (or oo ). These logical operators are classical and should not be confused with the paraconsistent ones introduced later (with o replaced by σ).
Formulas are built from types and terms; a formula is simply a term of type o. A τ , B τ , C τ , D τ , and E τ range over terms of type τ , and A, B, C, D, and E denote the formulas
We have primitive variables x, y, z, . . . and type variables a, b, c, . . . (in the interpretation these range over finite types only). U , V , and W range over type variables and X, Y , and Z range over primitive variables.
The idea behind the transfinite types is that the supra-booleans are the booleans and the boolean functions (hence all the finite types). In order to make this work we introduce a partial order on types (see the application term B γβ A α below). γ > α is the smallest relation between types such that if α is a finite type then σ > α and if γ > α then τ γ > τ α (hence σ > α iff α is a finite type). Since there are no types α, β, and γ such that α > β and β > γ it is transitive in a trivial sense. We write α ≥ β to indicate that α > β or α = β.
We have equality both as an operator of type τ τ for all types τ and also between types (finite types possibly with type variables). We have λ-abstractions, the choice operator ε and the universal quantifier ∀ for types (over finite types only). Hence the terms (and their types) are as follows:
Choice (given a non-empty set, it returns a member)
Equality between types, α and β finite types
Observe that the formation rules allow the formation of X τ where X is a primitive variable and τ is a type possibly with type variables. We omit some obvious types from now on, in particular on bound variables.
The logical operators are introduced as abbreviations (we here use ↔ as = on formulas, but with low priority):
The variable binders λ, ∀, and ∃ take a sequence of variables (a sequence would not make sense for ε). The variable binder ε chooses some X τ for which the formula A is satisfied (X τ can be free in A); if no such X τ exists then an arbitrary value is chosen (of the right type). The choice is global in the sense that all choices are the same for equivalent A's, hence for instance we have (εX τ .⊥) = (εX τ .⊥).
Given the usual properties of equality and λ-abstractions [7] it is quite straightforward to see that we obtain a classical logic from the abbreviations above.
As an illustration of the power of the propositional type logic P we consider the following example. In P terms to be interpreted as the number 0 and the successor function S can be defined in various ways, and number theory, with the recursive functions, can be derived. We use the empty n-ary relations as natural numbers as follows. First let 'ϕ' ≡ εx σ . x σ = ϕ be a shift operator for ϕ of any finite type α into the transfinite type σ. We define 0 ≡ '⊥' and S ≡ λm σ .εn σ .∃a.∃x a . m = x a ∧ n = λy o .x a of types σ and σσ, respectively. The set of natural numbers is λn σ .∀p σ .p0 ∧ (∀x σ .px → p(Sx)) → pn.
Propositional Type Logic -Proof System
We write A iff there is a proof of A from the axioms and the single rule:
As usual [. . . / . . .] denotes substitution of terms and types for free variables (only substitution of finite types allowed for type variables) and [. . .] simply denotes substitution for some anonymous variable.
The classical properties of the logical operators can be derived from the single rule above and the following axioms:
Free occurrences of X γ in B β must be free for free variables in A α
1
Free occurrences of U in A must be free for variables in τ
2
Free occurrences of U in A must be free for variables in α and β
3
Free occurrences of U in A must be free for distinct variables V and W Of course the axiom ∞ is a kind of axiom of infinity, but since it operates on the finite types only it can be regarded as "logical" with respect to the type logic.
Supra-Logic
As the above discussion of how to define the natural numbers shows we can do manipulations on the transfinite types by using the structure of the finite types.
In the supra-booleans σ we find booleans o and all the boolean functions from oo, ooo, . . . (all finite types). Inspired by the notion of indeterminacy as discussed by Evans [17] we consider and ⊥ to be the determinate truth values ∆ = {•, •} and S0, S(S0), . . . to be the indeterminate truth values ∇ = { , , . . .}. We reuse the symbols ∇ and ∆ later for related purposes.
Hence we propose to use the supra-booleans σ instead of the booleans o for the formulas φ of the propositional logic P o , yielding the supra-logic P σ as follows where ϕ is as ϕ except that all occurrences of o are replaced by σ:
We say that ϕ entails ψ iff ϕ → ψ (observe that this syntactic definition is the only possible since we do not discuss the semantics of the type theory).
The new operator is a S5 modality [23] of logical necessity and has type σo. It can be seen as the abbreviation:
Observe that we do not have to use the shift operator here, i.e. ' '.
What remains is of course to define the operators for negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, implication →, and biimplication ↔ in a paraconsistent setting, namely of type σ instead of type o. In the following we explain the working of these operators; it is then straightforward to express these definitions in the propositional type logic P. Very briefly we do the following:
For negation ¬ we propose to map • to • and vice versa, leaving the other values unchanged (after all, we want the double negation law ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ to hold for all formulas ϕ). We would like de Morgan laws to holds for disjunction ∨ with respect to negation ¬ and conjunction ∧; hence ϕ∨ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ). For implication → we have the classically acceptable ϕ → ψ ≡ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ. For conjunction ∧ we want the idempotent law to hold and • should to be neutral, and • is the default result. For biimplication ↔ we want reflexivity and • should to be neutral, • should be negation, and again • is the default result. The universal quantification is defined using the same principles as a kind of generalized conjunction and the existential quantification follows from a generalized de Morgan law.
The details are now to be spelled out. We follow the development in [32, 33] .
Logical Operators
The motivation for our logical operators is to be found in the key equalities shown to the right of the following semantic clauses (the basic semantic clause and the clause [[ ]] = • are omitted; further clauses are discussed later). Also ϕ ⇔ ¬¬ϕ is considered to be a key equality as well.
In the semantic clauses several cases may apply if and only if they agree on the result. The semantic clauses work for classical logic and also for our logic.
We have the following standard abbreviations (remember that the default type is supra-booleans, not booleans, for our logic):
Note that the abbreviations for and ⊥ in the transfinite type theory differ from the finite type theory approach in [33] .
For illustration purposes we provide finite truth tables. In order to show the result of operators of two arguments both being indeterminate we must consider at least four values.
As for conjunction and negation the motivation for the biimplication operator ↔ (and the implication operator → as defined later) is based on the few key equalities shown to the right of the following semantic clauses.
As before several cases may apply if and only if they agree on the result and the semantic clauses work for classical logic too. The semantic clauses are an extension of the clauses for equality:
We have the following abbreviations (we extend from type σo to σσ):
Note that the abbreviation for in the transfinite type theory differs from the finite type theory approach in [33] . We could also have used (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) for ϕ ⇔ ψ (using = instead of ⇔ in the definition of ⇒). Besides, ⇔ binds very loosely, even more loosely than ↔.
We could try the following standard abbreviations (these results are from [33] and some definitions are mentioned in [32] as well):
But here we have neither ϕ
We instead use the following abbreviations:
Although ϕ ψ does not entail ¬ψ ¬ϕ, we do have ϕ ϕ and ϕ ϕ, and this implication is very useful as we shall see in a moment.
We also use the predicate ∆ for determinacy and ∇ for indeterminacy with the following abbreviations:
We now come to the central abbreviations based directly on the semantic clauses above:
We could also use (ϕ ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ = ψ ∨ ∆ϕ ∨ ∆ψ) for ϕ ↔ ψ.
Conclusions
There are many paraconsistent logics, each with their advantages and disadvantages. Our aim has been to investigate how the propositional type logic P obtained as the propositional fragment of the transfinite type theory Q [4] can be used as a paraconsistent logic while at the same time serve as a classical foundation of mathematics. Hence we shall not consider here paraconsistent mathematics at all. Using the standard foundation of mathematics (axiomatic set theory) it is possible to show that the resulting supra-logic P σ is consistent. The reason why we move from o to σ is to allow additional "truth values" in order to handle inconsistency. How many additional values do we need? It seems reasonable to consider infinitely many -one for each proper constant we might introduce in a theory. We allow a few more abbreviations:
We can now state the interesting paraconsistency property of the supra-logic P σ succinctly:
φ →φ
We add that the type logics P and Q (and therefore also the supra-logic P σ ) have much fewer ontological commitments than standard set theory ZFC and hence might be more acceptable from a philosophical (or perhaps common-sense) point of view, cf. [10] and others who find set theory problematic. See [21] for further discussions of type theories and criteria of adequacy, consistency, economy and naturalness of various foundations of mathematics. The fragment Q 0 of the type logic Q is implemented in several automated theorem provers with many active users, e.g. [19, 28] . It is also known as higher order logic, and second order logic, first order logic and propositional logic P o can be seen as restrictions of Q 0 (see [5] for the details). Non-classical higher order logics are possible, e.g. intuitionistic higher order logic [24] .
One advantage of a higher order logic is that the logic is very expressive in the sense that most mathematical structures, functions and relations are available (for instance arithmetic). A paramount application of higher order logic is natural language semantics, in particular in the Montague grammar tradition of logical semantics [29, 16, 13] . In [31] it is shown how to obtain a paraconsistent logic for the propositional attitudes of agents while retaining classical logic for the observer, and the approach taken here can be used instead of using a special four-valued logic [26, 27] .
Finally we note that while it is true that in our logic ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ does not entail arbitrary ψ we do have that ¬ϕ entails ϕ → ψ and that ϕ entails ¬ϕ → ψ, hence we do not have a relevant logic [2] in general (but only for so-called first degree entailment). Recall that ϕ entails ψ iff ϕ → ψ (and is defined using for the transfinite type theory). Our logic validates clear "fallacies of relevance" like the one just noted, or like the inference from ϕ to ψ → ψ, but these do not seem problematic for the applications discussed above or in [33] , since entailments with implications as conclusions are not considered in many query answering systems (see [32] for a case study also investigated by N. C. A. da Costa and V. S. Subrahmanian). In future work we plan to investigate these relationships more closely.
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What I assert and believe to have demonstrated in this and earlier works is that following the finite there is a transfinite (which one could also call the supra-finite)...
Georg Cantor 1883
Quote from M. Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and the Limitation of Size, Clarendon Press, 1984 (page 39)
